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VI. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Class Action Suits
People aggrieved by racial discrimination in employment can sue for
relief under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' and section 1981
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.2 Individual discriminatory acts are recog-
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter referred to as Title VIII. In
addition to prohibiting racial discrimination in employment, Title VII also prohibits discrimi-
nation against persons because of their color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. at § 2000e-
2(a).
In order for a person to file suit under Title VII, he must first file with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) a charge that he has been discriminated
against by a respondent. Id. at § 2000e-5(b). Filing of a charge with EEOC is an absolute
prerequisite before an individual may later sue under Title VII. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). The EEOC is empowered to investigate the charge, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (1976), to determine whether reasonable
cause exists to believe the change is true, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975); see 29 C.F.R.
.§ 1601.19b (1976); EEOC COMPL. MAN (CCH) 311 (1976), and, if reasonable cause does
exist, to attempt to secure conciliation with Title VII from the respondent. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b) (Supp. V 1975); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1976). The charging party may institute suit
under Title VII only after he receives a notice of his right to sue from the EEOC. Such notice
is issued by the Commission only if the EEOC determines reasonable cause to believe the
charge is true does not exist, if concilliation discussions with the respondent are terminated,
or if the charging party requests such notice within 180 days of filing his charge. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 grants to "[aill persons" within the United
States the same rights "to make and enforce contracts" as are enjoyed by white citizens. Id.
This section and other related sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had long been dormant
in the area of private discrimination until revived by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In Jones, the Court rejected the argument that individuals
could sue under the 1866 Act only when there was government action involved in discrimina-
tory acts, and held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), which concerns property rights, prohibits
private racially discriminatory refusals to sell real estate property. 392 U.S. at 426, 437. In
dictum, the Court indicated that § 1981 could be applied similarly in private employment
discrimination cases. See id. at 441-42, n.78. On the authority of Jones, several commentators
argued that § 1981 could be applied to private employment discrimination, see, e.g., Kohl,
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55
VA. L. REv. 272 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kohl]; Larson, The Development of § 1981 as a
Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARv. Civ. RTs.-Civ. LIB. L.
REv. 45 (1972); Note, Is .§ 1981 Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 1970
DUKE L.J. 1223, and every circuit court that addressed the issue held that § 1981 applies to
private discrimination. Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival
of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449,
478 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Federal Power]; see, e.g., Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing
Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Caldwell v. National
Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v.
I.T.&T., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). Any doubts that § 1981 prohibits private racial discrimi-
nation in employment were later extinguished by the Supreme Court. In Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) the Court expressly held that § 1981 applied to
private racial discrimination. Id. at 459-60. For discussions of the historical bases supporting
the conclusion that provisions of the 1866 Act can be applied to private discrimination, see
Kohl, supra; Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justification for
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nized, however, as manifestations of a more general wrong against society.'
An individual suffers discrimination not because of his peculiar character-
istics as an individual, but because he is a member of a societal class
defined by possession of a racial characteristic.' Consequently, the use of
class action suits against persons who discriminate is viewed as an effica-
cious means of effectuating the congressional policy directed toward elimi-
nating discrimination generally.-
Because public policy favors class action suits against employment
discrimination, courts became lenient in permitting such suits under Fed-
eral Rule of Procedure 23.6 Several courts began certifying "across the
board" class action suits7 in which named plaintiffs were allowed to repre-
a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1024 (1972). The Johnson Court also rejected the
argument that Title VII preempts § 1981 and constitutes the exclusive remedy for employ-
ment discrimination. The Court held that the two civil rights acts augment each other, and
that merely because a plaintiff initially sues under Title VII, he is not foreclosed from pursu-
ing § 1981 or other available remedies for private discrimination. 421 U.S. at 459; see Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443
F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Federal Power, supra at 478-
80. See generally Note, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U.
RICH. L. REv. 339 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Independent Solutions]. The Court's view that
passage of Title VII did not preempt § 1981 is supported by the legislative history of Title
VII. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 108 reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2391, [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 914]. Further support may be found in
the fact that while drafting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Senate
rejected an amendment that would have made Title VII and § 1981 mutually exclusive
remedies. 118 CONG. REC. 3371-73 (1972); see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 461 (1975).
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-22 (1975); EEOC v. General Elec.
Co., 532 F.2d 359, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1976); see H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1971),
reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2139.
Note, The Class Action Device in Title VII Suits, 29 S.C.L. REv. 639, 644-45 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Class Action Device]; see Comment, The Class Action and Title
VII-An Overview, 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 325 (1976) [hereinafter cited as An Overviewi. See
generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 235 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Fiss].
118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (statements of Senator Williams); see 7 C. WRIGHT & R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1771, at 662 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT
& MILLERI; Class Action Device, supra note 4, at 644-45. In a class action suit, the representa-
tives of the class can seek to eliminate a discriminatory practice as it applies to all employees,
and to obtain relief for all employees aggrieved by the practice. Note, Civil Procedure-Class
Action Suits-Class Wide Awards of Back Pay in Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1039 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Class Wide Awardsl.
When Rule 23, which governs certification of class actions, was redrafted in 1966, the drafters
made a special effort to accommodate more easily class action suits in aiscrimination cases.
7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra § 1771, at 662; see Advisory Committee's Notes, FED. R. Civ. P.
23.
, See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1771, at 662-63; Class Wide Awards,
supra note 5 at 1032; An Overview, supra note 4 at 326; Comment, Class Actions and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Proper Class and the Class Representative, 47 TULANE
L. REv. 1005 (1973).
1 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1095 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as SCHLEI & GRossMAN]; see e.g., Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir.
19781
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sent persons aggrieved by employment practices that had not affected the
plaintiffs personally, and sue to eliminate all of an employer's discrimina-
tory practices.8 Theoretically, the wrongs suffered by the plaintiffs were
merely indicia of the more general wrong against the societal class, and,
therefore, the societal wrong, and not the personal injury, was the subject
of such suits.9 Permitting such suits apparently conflicted with the mini-
mal requirements of Rule 23.10 Recently, however, the Fourth Circuit de-
cided Roman v. ESB, Inc.," in which the court indicated its disfavor of
certification of "across-the-board" class action suits in employment dis-
crimination cases.
In Roman, the plaintiffs were black, former employees who had been
laid off by the defendant company.'2 Alleging that ESB had discriminated
in hiring, firing, compensating, and promoting black employees, the plain-
tiffs sought to bring their suit on behalf of all black applicants for employ-
ment by ESB, and all present and former employees of the company.'
3
1975); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974).
See e.g., Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
See generally, SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 7 at 1088-95; Class Action Service, supra
note 4, at 644-45, 655.
I" See East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 97 S. Ct. 1891, 1896-98 (1977); 7
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1771 at 663; Class Wide Awards, supra note 5, at 1033-34;
An Overview, supra note 4, at 329.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) sets forth the prerequisites which plaintiffs must satisfy before they
can be permitted to bring their suit as representatives of a class.
550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'g 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. T 9416 (D.S.C. 1973).
2 550 F.2d at 1345-46.
" Id. at 1346. All claims originally brought by the black employees were dismissed when
the district court limited the class to employees who were laid off, and dismissed any claims
not relating to the layoffs. See text accompanying notes 14-17.
The decisions by the Roman courts do not reveal under which Civil Rights Act the action
was brought. The Fourth Circuit states in its opinion that the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) claims
were dismissed by the district court. 550 F.2d at 1346. In the district court opinion, however,
the court does not mention whether the § 1981 claim was dismissed, but refers to the action
as being maintained under both § 1981 and Title VII. See 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9416, at 7832,
7846. Furthermore, there is no indication in the district court opinion that the plaintiffs ever
filed charges before the EEOC, see id., which is an absolute prerequisite for maintaining a
suit under Title VII. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); see note 1
supra. Whether the action was brought under either statute alone would have little effect on
the course and conduct of the case. Although Title VII and § 1981 are not coextensive,
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), both statutes prohibit
racially discriminatory employment practices, see id. at 459, require satisfaction of the same
burden of proof by plaintiffs, see Independent Solutions, supra note 2, at 347, and provide
virtually the same remedies. Federal Power, supra note 2, at 480; see H.R. REP. No. 914, supra
note 2, at 274-78 (remarks of Representatives Poff and Cramer). Title VII, however, provides
plaintiffs with assistance in investigating and conciliating claims, and enables plaintiffs to
obtain additional awards, such as attorney's fees, which are unavailable under § 1981. John-
son v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975); cf., Note, Is § 1981 Modified
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223 (arguing that plaintiffs under




After the trial was concluded, the district court found that the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs primarily concerned the layoff of the black
employees, and consequently limited composition of the class to those
black employees v~ho were laid off during the time period that was the
subject of the complaint.'4 The court then dismissed the class action suit
on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the requisites of Rule
23, '5 and on the further ground that the plaintiffs had failed to prove a
prima facie case on the merits.'" In a split en banc decision, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed.'
7
By affirming the district court's defining of the class as including only
those blacks affected by the layoff, the Fourth Circuit implicitly applied
the Rule 23 prerequisite that representative plaintiffs in a class action
must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.'" A corrollary
" 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9416, at 7846-47.
I5 d.
" Id. at 7847-48.
17 550 F.2d 1343 (1976). Judges Winter, Butzner, and Craven dissented from the majority
opinion. See id. at 1357-62 (Winter, J., dissenting).
After defining the class, the Roman district court dismissed the class action on the
grounds the plaintiffs failed to meet two of the Rule 23 prerequisites. The first ground con-
cerned the "numerosity" prerequisite, that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Fourty-four plaintiffs had joined in the
complaint against ESB. The court found that there were only eleven more members of the
class aggrieved by the layoffs, and that, consequently, the prerequisite had not been satisfied.
7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9416, at 7846-47.
The determination whether the numerosity requirement is satisfied involves more than
a test of numbers. 1 H. NEWBURG, CLAss ACTIONS, § 1105 (1977). Rather, the principle determi-
nation is -:,hether joining all members of the class will result in litigational hardships or
inconvenience. Id. at § l105a; see e.g., Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d
638, 645 (4th Cir. 1975). Such a determination must be made on the facts and circumstances
of each particular case. 3B J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.05, at 23-277 to 280; (2d ed.
1977); see Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 533 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1976); Swain v. Brinegar,
517 F.2d 766, 780 (7th Cir. 1975). In determining whether a class meets the "numerosity"
requirement, courts consider, in addition to the size of the class, the nature of the action,
the size of the individual claims, and the location of both defendants and potential plaintiffs.
See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1762, at 594-600. Because they possess
potentially greater access to such facts and circumstances of cases, district judges are afforded
wide latitudes within which to exercise their discretion in determining whether a class satis-
fies the "numerosity" requirement, and are not overturned unless their determination consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion or an impermissible application of law. 3B J. MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 23.05, at 23-280 (2d ed. 1977); see 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, at § 1759;
see e.g., Polin v. Conduciron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 1977); Peterson v. Oklahoma
City Hous. Auth., 545 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1976). Furthermore, plaintiffs have the
burden of showing that the class satisfies the numerosity requirement. 3B J. MooRE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 23.05, at 23-278 (2d ed. 1977); see e.g., Afro America Patrolmens League v. Duck,
503 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 1974). In consideration of these factors, the Roman court found
the determination that the class failed to meet the "numerosity" requirement was "so appar-
ently correct as to require no discussion." 550 F.2d at 1349.
1, See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The Roman court explicitly mentioned the representation
requirement in affirming dismissal of the class action, see 550 F.2d at 1349, but did not
discuss the requirement in connection with defining the class representative by plaintiffs. The
Fourth Circuit did not conceptually bifurcate their analysis of the action as did the district
1978]
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of this prerequisite requires that class action plaintiffs must be members
of the class they purport to represent.'9 The reason for the requirement is
that all members of the class are bound by final judgment in a case,20 and,
consequently, all issues affecting any member should be prosecuted fully.
A plaintiff, however, is most likely to prosecute fully only those issues in
which he has a personal interest. By requiring that plaintiffs generally have
interests comprehensive of those of the class they represent, the rule in-
sures that members of the class will not be bound by determinations on
issues the plaintiffs are unlikely to litigate fully in court.2' In affirming the
district court's limiting the class to include only those persons aggrieved
by the layoff, the Roman court indicated that in discrimination cases
plaintiffs are likely to represent adequately only interests arising out of
actions by which they are personally aggrieved, 2 and consequently class
action plaintiffs should be permitted to represent only other persons simi-
larly affected by the same or similar actions by a defendant.
The Roman court's view conflicts with that of courts permitting "across
the board" suits in discrimination cases. Courts permitting such suits have
adopted the notion that a particular action by a defendant affecting repre-
sentative individuals is merely an indicium of discrimination against a
class defined by race,2 and that the actual wrong committed is defendant's
effectuation of a general policy of race discrimination. 2 Consequently, any
individual affected in any way by that policy may qualify as a representa-
tive adequately representing the interests all members of the class affected
in any way for purposes of eliminating the general policy of discrimina-
tion.', The Roman court's decision accords, however, with the recent Su-
preme Court decision in East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez,2 which may sound the death knell for "across-the-board" suits
court in first defining the class, then dismissing the action on behalf of that defined class;
rather, the court treated the issues the district court considered in defining the class as
pertaining to the issue whether the initial class action was maintainable. See 550 F.2d at 1348-
49, 1355-57.
11 See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Hernandez v. Gray, 530 F.2d 858 (10th
Cir. 1976); Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 1975). The require-
ment is often stated in the terms that the representatives must have standing to raise the
issues they seek to raise. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, at § 1761; Class Action Device,
supra note 4 at 649.
I" See Class Wide Awards, supra note 5, at 1033-34. See generally, 7 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 5, at §§ 1761, 1771.
21 See I H. NEWBURG, CLASS ACTIONS § 1062 (1977).
"I See 550 F.2d 1248-49. The fact that the evidence presented by the named plaintiffs in
Roman generally concerned only the layoffs, id. at 1348, provides an example that plaintiffs
usually fully litigate only those claims concerning actions by which they are personally ag-
grieved.
" See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 8, at 1095.
21 Id.: see, e.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
11 See cases cited note 24 supra.
26 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
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in discrimination cases. The Rodriguez Court held that to qualify as a class
representative in discrimination cases,2 a plaintiff must be a member of
the class he attempts to represent and "possess the same interest and
suffer the same injury" as other class members.2 8 Noting that the mere fact
a complaint alleges discriminatory practices does not insure the named
plaintiffs will adequately protect class interests, the Court stated that Rule
23 must be carefully applied in discrimination cases, 2 19 and held that be-
cause the named plaintiffs had not personally suffered injuries as a result
of the practices they sought to challenge, they were ineligible to represent
a class of persons who did suffer injuries as a result of those practices.3
0
Affirming the district court's definition of the class represented by
plaintiffs in Roman, the Fourth Circuit also upheld the dismissal of the
action on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to prove a prima facie case
of employment discrimination against ESB.2 Plaintiffs had attempted to
rely principally on statistical evidence 2 indicating that the ratio of blacks
2 In Rodriguez, the court found the named plaintiffs had not been discriminated against,
and were therefore not members of the class they sought to represent. Id. at 403-06. Conse-
quently, the court did not address the issue current in "across the board" suits whether a
person who has been discriminated against in one practice can represent others affected by
other practices. The court, however, emphatically emphasized that Rule 23 requirements
must be strictly applied in discrimination cases, id. at 405, and indicated that the controlling
consideration should be whether named plaintiffs will adequately represent all the interests
of the alleged class. Id. at 403.
I Id. at 405.
29 Id.
1* Id. at 403-04.
1' 550 F.2d at 1352. The Fourth Circuit also evaluated the evidence presented concerning
whether ESB engaged in discriminatory practices other than those alleged in connection with
the layoffs. See id. at 1352-1355. Such an endeavor was unnecessary since by limiting the class
involved to only those persons affected by the layoffs, the court removed issues not concerning
the layoffs from consideration. The Roman court indicated that such issues had been removed
from consideration by later acknowledging that the district court decision dismissing the class
action bound only the named plaintiffs. Id. at 1355-56.
Since the class action suit was dismissed, judgment was entered against only the joined
plaintiffs in the action. See 550 F.2d at 1355-56. Judgment against all the joined parties in
Roman necessarily required a determination that the layoff was not discriminatory as to any
of the plaintiffs. See McNellis v. Mechanics Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.
1967); Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 410 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. Ill. 1976). The district
court decision clearly indicates that findings of fact concerning each plaintiff had been made.
See 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9416 at 7837-45.
* Statistics are the evidence most commonly used to prove discrimination against a
class. 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 2330 (1977). When there is no specific evidence of racial
animus, statistics showing that an employment practice, although facially neutral, such as
layoffs according to a seniority system, has a significantly racially disproportionate result may
be sufficient to show the practice is discriminatory. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
432 (1971); King v. Yellow Freight Syst., Inc., 523 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1975); Barnett v. W. T.
Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 8, at 1154; Federal
Power, supra note 5 at 479.
If a plaintiff proves his prima facie case that an employment practice or requirement has
a discriminatory impact, the employer may escape liability if he proves the practice was
essential to his business. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 805-06 (1973);
1978]
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to whites laid off was disproportionate to the ratio of blacks to whites
employed by the company.3" Courts presented with the issue have consis-
tently held that statistical evidence revealing disproportionate racial im-
pact of employment practices may be competent for proving a prima facie
case of employment discrimination, but have reached varying results con-
cerning how statistically disproportionate the impact of an employment
practice must be before the practice can be held discriminatory on the
basis of statistical evidence alone. 4 The Roman court, determining that
the evidence in the case revealed an insignificant statistical imbalance, 35
derived a minimal standard which statistical evidence must meet, and
held that absent supporting evidence of specific discriminatory acts, evi-
dence revealing an insignificant statistical imbalance is not sufficient to
establish a prima facie case case of employment discrimination.3 6
The Roman court's decision is consistent with recent Supreme Court
decisions concerning the use of such evidence in discrimination cases.
Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are not required to prove a
defendant intended to discriminate;3 7 rather, they need only prove that a
practice or requirement had a significant discriminatory effect. 8 Because,
however, plaintiffs must prove a practice or requirement has discrimina-
tory effects by a preponderance of the evidence, 39 something more than a
Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976). If the employer sustains this burden of
proof, the plaintiff can rebut by showing some other practice or requirement with significantly
less discriminatory effects would serve the business purpose as well. Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). The allegedly discriminatory activity in Roman was the layoff of
employees. See 550 F.2d at 1345-46. Although the layoff had some racially disproportionate
effects, the Fourth Circuit found the layoffs were a business necessity because of the then
current financial condition of the company. Id. at 1346-47.
1 550 F.2d at 1348. The court first found that the company had not discriminated in
hiring prior to the layoff, and that the proportion of blacks employed by the company was
similar to the proportion of blacks in the community. Id. at 1353. Consequently, black em-
ployees had not been locked into the seniority system, which determined the order of layoffs,
as a result of discriminatory practices. The court further found that after the layoff, the
proportion of blacks in the affected seniority categories had remained virtually the same, and
that similar percentages of blacks and whites in each category were laid off. Id. at 1352.
" SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 8, at 1161-62; see e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing & Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.
1972); see Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
550 F.2d at 1350-52.
Id. at 1351.
37 Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA.
L. REv. 463, 464-65 (1973). Title VII is directed towards discriminatory effects of employment
practices, and not the motivation behind such practices. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971). Courts generally apply the same principle in § 1981 cases, and plaintiffs are
seldom required to show a defendant acted with discriminatory intent. See Sapol v. Snyder,
524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1974);
Jimerson v. Kisco Co., 404 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
• Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA.
L. REv. 463, 465 (1973).
" Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977).
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slight discrepancy in figures is necessary to justify imposing liability for
discrimination on a defendant.'" Consequently, the Supreme Court has in
several recent cases held that for statistical evidence to alone establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, the evidence must reveal gross statisti-
cal disparities in terms of the effect of a practice or requirement.4' The
Roman court's decision requiring that evidence must show more than an
insignificant racially disproportionate impact in order to prove a prima
facie cases accords with subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
EDITORIAL STAFF
B. Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well estab-
lished and provides that no one is entitled to judicial review of his claims
until appropriate administrative remedies have been exhausted.1 The
basic purpose served by the doctrine is to prevent judicial interference with
the administrative process and thereby permit agencies to make decisions
that are discretionary and entrusted to their special competence.2 Addi-
tionally, judicial review of allegations not first examined by an agency may
be difficult because of the absence of a factual record on those claims,
developed through the application of the agency's expertise.' Finally, judi-
cial review often may be unnecessary when an agency completes its pro-
ceedings and is able, therefore, to discover and correct its own errors.4
In Weitzel v. Portney,5 the Fourth Circuit applied the doctrine of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies to refuse judicial review of allegations
not pressed during administrative hearings.' Weitzel, an Internal Revenue
See generally, Fiss, A Theory of Unemployment Law, 38 U. Con. L. REv. 235 (1970).
, Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-38 (1977).
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
2 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).
3 Id.
Id. at 195.
5 548 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1977).
1 548 F.2d at 492. The Fourth Circuit also applied the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies in Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. OSHRC, 545 F.2d 1384 (4th Cir. 1976). The case
originated with a citation issued to Fieldcrest Mills by the Secretary of Labor for violation of
a safety and health standard protecting employees against dangers resulting from the accu-
mulation of raw cotton dust. The administrative law judge granted Fieldcrest's motion for
summary judgment, determining that the OSHA standard was invalid as not properly issued
under the authorizing statute. Id. at 1384-85. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970). The Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) vacated the administrative order, upheld
the standard, and remanded the case to the administrative law judge for a hearing on the
merits. 545 F.2d at 1385. Fieldcrest appealed to the Fourth Circuit, claiming that the OSHRC
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Service employee, brought an action to redress denial of his application for
promotion, alleging sex discrimination. He also alleged that the IRS failed
to follow applicable agency regulations, and that the IRS breached its
labor contract with the National Association of Internal Revenue Service
Employees (NAIRE). The appellate court granted a trial de novo on the
sex discrimination claim,7 but refused jurisdiction over the remaining alle-
gations, stating that Weitzel had failed to exhaust the appropriate admin-
istrative remedies and union grievance procedures.
Weitzel failed to obtain a promotion to which he felt himself entitled.
Seeking review of the promotion selection proceeding, he filed informal and
formal complaints of sex discrimination with the IRS. The IRS conducted
an investigation and issued a preliminary report. Weitzel then requested
and received a hearing from the IRS, in which he repeated the sex discrimi-
nation charge, and in addition alleged that the IRS failed to follow proce-
dures mandated by its own regulations and those of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) in handling the promotion application.' Despite find-
ing that sex discrimination was not involved in the promotion denial, the
hearing officer who conducted the formal hearing for the IRS recom-
mended that the selection procedure be repeated, because of procedural
irregularities This recommendation was rejected by the IRS.10 Weitzel
then appealed to the CSC Appeal Review Board on the sex discrimination
order was final, that the company was adversely affected by it, and that the order was
therefore ripe for review. Id. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(c), 660(a) (1970). For purposes of judicial
review, a final order is one "affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary's [of Labor]
citation or proposed penalty." See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970). Because the decision of the
OSHRC was not a decision on the merits of the Secretary's citation, the Fourth Circuit held
that the order was not final, and therefore not reviewable. 545 F.2d at 1386. The court stated
that Fieldcrest's appeal of the Commission's order was an example of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Prior to being allowed recourse to the
courts, Fieldcrest was required to pursue the hearing on the merits before the administrative
law judge, as ordered by OSHRC. Id. The court conditioned Fieldcrest's right to judicial
review on its having exhausted the administrative process, in order to permit the agency to
complete the proceedings delegated to it by Congress, free from premature interference. See
545 F.2d at 1386.
1 In granting the trial de novo, the Fourth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's decision
in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976). The Supreme Court there held that federal
employees have a right to a trial de novo under § 717(c), Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964
(amended in 1972), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975). 425 U.S. at 864. Title VII is
directed at preventing discrimination in employment matters. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-
16(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
1 Weitzel alleged that the IRS ignored his previous "reduction-in-force" demotion. Civil
Service Commission regulations require that an agency give persons so demoted preference
over all other applicants for promotion. 548 F.2d at 492. See 5 C.F.R. § 330.302 (1977).
1 The Fourth Circuit noted that the hearing officer's re-selection recommendation was
dropped from the report prior to submission to the CSC Appeal Review Board, in accordance
with 5 C.F.R. § 713.218(g) (1977), as not pertinent to the question of unfair employment
practices. 548 F.2d at 492 n.4. Weitzel thus did not learn of the recommendation until after
the CSC Appeal Review Board heard and decided his appeal as to the sex discrimination
complaint. Id.
"0 Id. at 492.
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charge, but did not appeal on the claim of procedural irregularities." The
Board affirmed the finding that no discrimination had occurred in the
selection process.' 2 Weitzel then sought a de novo hearing in district court
of his allegations of sex discrimination, procedural irregularities, and
breach of the union contract. The district court denied a trial de novo on
the sex discrimination claim and held that the remaining two allegations
were barred by Weitzel's failure to exhaust administrative remedies or to
use the union grievance procedure.' 3 Weitzel then appealed to the Fourth
Circuit. Since he failed to raise the procedural irregularities, first alleged
before the hearing officer, in his appeal to the Review Board, the Fourth
Circuit held that his request for judicial review on those grounds was
barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 4 The court found
that administrative remedies were available to Weitzel and that no reasons
were given excusing his failure to exhaust them.'"
The Fourth Circuit also applied the exhaustion doctrine. to foreclose
Weitzel's appeal on the breach of contract claim.'" Weitzel alleged that the
evaluation of his application for promotion by a person other than his
immediate supervisor violated the provisions of the IRS labor agreement
with NAIRE.' Like the CSC regulation, the NAIRE contract included
grievance procedures,"5 which were the first avenue of recourse.'9 Employ-
ees of private enterprises have long been required to exhaust contractual
grievance procedures before seeking judicial relief for breach of labor-
management contracts." The Supreme Court has held that the policy
underlying federal labor law requires exhaustion, so that contractual griev-
ance procedures remain the preferred method of settling labor disputes.2'
Since the grievance procedure for federal employees was modeled after
existing federal labor law policy, the Fourth Circuit held that the exhaus-
tion doctrine was applicable to public employees' grievances, and dis-
" See note 9 supra.
' 548 F.2d at 492.
'1 Id. at 491.
" Id. at 492. See note 9 supra.
'5 Id. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 771.311 and 300.104(b) (1977), cited by the court as providing
general procedures for employee grievances. See also text accompanying notes 1-4 supra
(discussion of the exhaustion doctrine).
" 548 F.2d at 493.
,7 Id. at 491.
The grievance procedure was included in the labor agreement pursuant to Executive
Order No. 11491, 36 Fed. Reg. 17319 (1971), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976). Section 13
of the Order requires that labor agreements include procedures for consideration of grievances
not otherwise governed by statutory appeals procedures. Id.
11 548 F.2d at 491.
See Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
21 In Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), the Supreme Court dismissed an
employee's suit to enforce a severance pay provision because the contractual grievance proce-
dure was not pursued first. The Court noted congressional approval of such procedures as the
preferred method of settling labor disputes, thereby assuring a union's status as exclusive
bargaining representative, and limiting the choice of remedies to be applied against employ-
ers. Id. at 653.
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missed Weitzel's breach of contract claim for failure to exhaust the con-
tractual remedies. 2
The Fourth Circuit found that Weitzel had exhausted the administra-
tive remedies on his allegation of sex discrimination and that a de novo
hearing in district court was therefore proper on that claim. The allega-
tions of procedural irregularities24 and of violation of the labor agreement,2
however, were barred from examination as independent claims in the trial
de novo, even though they arose out of the same incident. The court's
refusal to permit examination of these allegations raises the issue of what
allegations, arguably related to a sex discrimination claim, should be in-
cluded in a de novo hearing properly granted on the discrimination claim.
Strict application of the exhaustion doctrine and liberal construction of
Title VII present alternative approaches to this problem.
Refusal to examine allegations of procedural irregularities in a trial de
novo may be in conflict with the purpose of the 1972 amendments to Title
VI.L2 Both the broad language27 and the legislative history28 of the amend-
ments disclose a congressional intent to eliminate discrimination in federal
employment. In addition, employment discrimination claims of public
employees are entitled to broad review, which may go beyond the employ-
ees' specific allegations. 9 A liberal construction of the procedure estab-
lished in Title VII for prosecution of federal employee discrimination
claims might therefore be justified. Examination of employees' allegations
of procedural irregularities could then be allowed in a trial de novo on the
discrimination charge, at least to the extent that the allegations evidenced
the occurrence of discriminatory practices."
548 F.2d at 493.
2 See note 6 supra.
24 See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
2 See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. V 1975).
2 Section 17(a), Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended in 1972) states that
"[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees . . . of the Federal Government . . . shall be
made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. V 1975).
Examining the equal employment provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress
noted that "an aggrieved Federal employee . . . must overcome a U.S. Government defense
of sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no certainty as to
the steps that must be taken to exhaust such remedies." S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
15 (1971). See also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 2 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2158 (1972). For such reasons, Congress gave federal employees the
option to bring suit in federal court either after a final disposition of the employees' com-
plaints by the agency or the CSC, or after 180 days elapsed from filing of the complaint. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975). Administrative remedies were thereby defined and a
clear procedure provided for employees.
2' Civil Service Commission regulations provide that investigations of employee com-
plaints shall include "a thorough review of the circumstances under which the alleged dis-
crimination occurred . . . and any policies and practices related to the work situation which
may constitute, or appear to constitute, discrimination even though they have not been
expressly cited by the complainant." 5 C.F.R. § 713.216(a) (1977) (emphasis added).
1o See 548 F.2d at 493.
[Vol. XXXV
8 FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Despite the existence of an argument for inclusion of allegations related
to the central sex discrimination claim,31 courts traditionally have followed
the exhaustion doctrine in limiting the scope of inquiry in a Title VII
action." While the Supreme Court has found a statutory right to a trial
de novo in such actions brought by federal employees, the Court has not
required that claims related to the discrimination charge, but not raised
at administrative levels, be considered in the trial de novo.13 The exhaus-
tion doctrine appears to foreclose examination of related claims as inde-
pendent issues in a de novo hearing granted on a claim of sex discrimina-
tion. The Supreme Court has applied the doctrine to deny inclusion of
previously unasserted claims, and claims extraneous to a Title VII allega-
tion in a civil action in a federal district court. 4 Several circuits, faced with
Title VII claims, have applied the exhaustion doctrine to require plaintiffs
to follow the administrative prerequisites provided by Title VII and related
regulations. 5 While they do not conclusively answer the question raised by
the Weitzel decision, the courts' holdings exemplify a judicial preference
that all available administrative remedies be utilized before allowing judi-
cial review.
The Fourth Circuit's use of the exhaustion doctrine to bar inclusion in
the de novo hearing of Weitzel's separate allegations as bases for indepen-
dent review is supported by traditional application of the doctrine. Appar-
ently reconciling the goals of Title VII with the strictness of the exhaustion
doctrine, though, the Weitzel court would still permit the appellant to
introduce these allegations as evidence in support of the discrimination
claim."8 The Fourth Circuit's decision therefore prevented circumvention
of existing administrative procedures, while advancing the goal of Title VII
to prevent employment discrimination.
ScoTT E. TINNON
", See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
at See text accompanying notes 34-35 infra.
3 See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976). See note 6 supra.
31 Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). The Supreme Court stated that "§ 717 [42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975)], with its rigorous administrative exhaustion requirements . . .
would be driven out of currency were immediate access to the courts under other, less de-
manding statutes permissible." 425 U.S. at 833. This statement is perhaps indicative of
judicial desire to preserve the Title VII trial de novo strictly for examination of discrimination
allegations.
31 See Ettinger v. Johnson, 518 F.2d 648, 652 (3d Cir. 1975); Brown v. GSA, 507 F.2d 1300,
1307-08 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 820 (1976); Gibson v. Kroger Co., 506 F.2d 647, 650
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975); cf. Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.
1972) (federal employee discrimination case involving 42 U.S.C. § 1981, where exhaustion
doctrine was applied to require plaintiff to present all claims within agency's jurisdiction to
that agency).
1 548 F.2d at 493. See also text accompanying note 30 supra.
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